My research interests centre around methodological, epistemological and ontological questions about science. In particular I'm interested in

• Theory-choice. What is the weight of successful novel predictions in the appraisal of theories? What is the role of theoretical virtues in theory choice? As to the former question, temporal predictivism has been questioned as a accurate description of scientific practice. Instead, so-called heuristic predictivism has been defended, which I believe fails for several reasons. In a recent paper I argue for a form of 'local-symptomatic' predictivism, i.e., the view that successful novel predictions matter only insofar as they reveal another theoretical property. As to the second question, I'm particularly interested in cases of theory-choice in which theoretical virtues are given priority over empirical accuracy.

• Theory-ladenness. I think the impact of theories on data reliability judgments has been underrated. I try to rectify this with the notion of theory-driven data reliability judgments (TDRs). TDRs pose the threat of theory-ladenness in a hitherto unappreciated form.

• The nature of explanation: how are scientific explanations to be construed? Can false explanantia be genuinely explanatory? I believe the latter question has to be answered in the affirmative, albeit a recent account of these types of explanation is to be deemed unsuccessful in my view.

• History and Philosophy of Science. What is the benefit of the HPS approach? Why is it not enough for us to philosophize about science by studying contemporary science? In much of work I use historical case studies. In a recent paper I defend the HPS approach.