Below are listed my forthcoming and published peer-reviewed papers, plus other papers, reviews, and (yet) unpublished papers. To jump to the latter, click here.

Published peer-reviewed papers

  1. A coherentist conception of ad hoc hypothesesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science, Volume 67, February 2018, Pages 54–64. [preprint]
  2. Kuhnian theory-choice and virtue convergence: facing the base rate fallacy, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,Volume 64, August 2017, pp. 30-37. [preprint]
  3. Theoretical Fertility McMullin-style, European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, [preprint], , Volume 7, Issue 1, pp. 151–173.
  4. Scientific discovery: that-what’s and what-that’s, Ergo (open access), 2015, Volume 2, No. 6, 123-148. [preprint].
  5. Explanatory fictions—for real?, Synthese, May 2014, Volume 191(8), pp 1741-55. [preprint]
  6. A matter of Kuhnian theory-choice? The GSW model and the neutral current, Perspectives on Science, 2014, 22(4), pp. 491–522. [preprint]
  7. Novelty, Coherence, and Mendeleev’s periodic table, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, March 2014, p. 62-69. [preprint]
  8. The Kuhnian mode of HPS’, Synthese, December 2013, Vol. 190 (18), pp 4137-4154. [preprint]
  9. Mechanistic explanation: asymmetry lost, V. Karakostas and D. Dieks (eds.) (2013), Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems, The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, Dordrecht: Springer. [preprint]
  10. Theory-laden experimentation, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 44, issue 1, March 2013, pp. 89–101. [preprint]
  11. Bogen and Woodward’s data-phenomena distinction and forms of theory-ladenness, Synthese, Volume 182(1), 2011, pp. 39-55. [preprint]
  12. Model, Theory, and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Dec. 2008, vol. 59(4), pp. 619-658. [preprint]
  13. Use-Novel Predictions and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2008, volume 39( 2), pp. 265-269. [preprint]
  14. Rehabilitating Theory: Refusal of the “bottom-up” Construction of Scientific Phenomena, Studies in the History and the Philosophy of Science, volume 38(1), March 2007, pp. 160-184. [preprint]

Other publications

  1. Observation and theory-ladenness, in B. Kaldis (ed.), (2013), Encyclopaedia for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Los Angeles: SAGE publishing. [preprint]
  2. Invariance, Mechanisms, and Epidemiology, commentary on R. Campaner: ‘Causality and Explanation: Issues from Epidemiology’, in: Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered, edited by S. Hartmann, M. Weber, W.J. Gonzalez, D. Dieks, T. Uebel, 2010, Berlin: Springer. [preprint]

Book reviews

  1. Must Philosophy be constrained? Book review of Edouard Machery: Philosophy within its proper bounds. Co-authored with Anna Drożdżowicz, Pierre Saint-Germier. Forthcoming in Metascience.
  2. Philosophy of Science for the Uninitiated. Review of Samir Okasha’s ‘Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction‘, Metascience, March 2018, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 107–109, [draft]
  3. A theory of everything. Book review of Richard Dawid’s String Theory and the Scientific Method, Philosophy of Science, scheduled for July, 2016 Volume 83 Issue 3, pp. 453-8 [preprint on philsci archive]
  4. Coherent programme at last? Review of Integrating History and Philosophy of Science, Metascience, July 2013, Volume 22, issue 2, pp 457-460
  5. Conceptions of Causality. Review of Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics, Peter K. Machamer, Gereon Wolters (eds.), University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007; Metascience. , Volume 18, Issue 2, pp 301-305. [preprint]

Find me also on PhilPapers and PhilSci-Archive.


Papers under review / work in progress

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  • Armchair Physics and the Method of Cases (with Pierre Saint-Germier)
    In this paper, we seek to strengthen the expertise defense against those philosophers who believe that experimental findings concerning folk judgements in thought experiments can cast doubt on the traditional method of cases. We argue that the analogy underlying the expertise defense is best drawn between judgements in thought experiments in philosophy and judgements in thought experiments in physics: they are relevantly similar. We base our improved expertise defense on an empirical study about judgements in thought experiments in physics.
  • Model Fictions, Structural Necessitation, and Explanatory Liberalism
    Some philosophers have argued that scientific models can explain their targets despite representationally distorting them. In this paper, I propose an account of model explanation based on the notion of structural necessitation, i.e., the representation of empirical regularities as necessities within a model. Although my account is much more liberal than its competitors, the notion of structural necessitation also helps to avoid explanatory anarchism.
  • Constructive Theories and Explanation by Necessitation
    Einstein famously distinguished between constructive and principle theories. He believed only the former to be explanatory. Lange has recently argued that principle theories explain, too, by virtue of putting necessary constraints on the laws of physics. In this paper, I want to draw attention to the fact that constructive theories also offer explanations in terms of necessities: they represent contingent regularities as necessities. I call this feature ‘structural necessitation’ and the understanding afforded by it ‘how-necessarily’ understanding. In contrast to the necessities of Lange’s explanations by constraint, structural necessitation can be brought about by causal mechanisms.
  • Pseudo-solutions to the demarcation problem
    A very popular way of demarcating science from pseudo-science is based on the idea that scientific ideas are testable, whereas non-scientific ideas are not. Pseudo-science is furthermore said to be dogmatic in that it does not seriously consider alternatives, nor does it take negative evidence seriously enough. Although this way of thinking about the demarcation problem has become a cliché, things are unfortunately not as simple as the cliché would have it. Nevertheless, the demarcation problem is important and should be addressed. Contrary to what has been suggested by some, we thus shouldn’t deflate it. Recently championed solutions based on Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, I argue, are pseudo-solutions.