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- "Rehabilitating
Theory. The Refusal of the bottom-up construction of Scientific
Phenomena", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,
Volume 38, Issue 1, March 2007, pp. 160-184 (full paper @
Studies or here
)
- In
this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward’s (1988) data/phenomena
distinction, which in a similar way to Cartwright’s construal of the
model of superconductivity (1995)—although in a different domain—argues
for a ‘bottom-up’ construction of phenomena from data without the
involvement of
theory. I
criticise Bogen and Woodward’s account by analysing their melting point
of lead example in depth, which is usually cited in the literature to
illustrate the data/phenomenon distinction. Yet, the main focus of this
paper lies on Matthias Kaiser’s (1995) case study of the plate tectonic
revolution, the most extensive case study that has been put forth to
support the bottom-up construction of phenomena. On the basis of new
historical evidence, which has been overlooked not only by Kaiser but
also by the entire historical literature on the plate tectonic
revolution, I demonstrate that phenomena are not constructed from the
bottom-up but rather, admittedly counter-intuitively, from the
top-down. 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
- "Use-novel
predictions and the Periodic Table", Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science, Volume 39, Issue 2, June 2008, Pages
265-269, (full
paper @
Studies or here)
- In
this paper I comment on a recent paper by [Scerri, E., &
Worrall,
J. (2001). Prediction and the periodic table. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science, 32, 407–452.] about the role temporally novel
and usenovel predictions played in the acceptance of Mendeleev’s
periodic table after the proposal of the latter in 1869. Scerri and
Worrall allege that whereas temporally novel predictions—despite
Brush’s earlier claim to the contrary—did not carry any special
epistemic weight, use-novel predictions did indeed contribute to the
acceptance of the table. Although I agree with their first claim, I
disagree with their second. In order to spell out my disagreement, I
not only revisit Scerri and Worrall’s interpretation of crucial
historical evidence they have cited in support of the ‘heuristic
account’ of use-novel predictions, but I also criticise thelatter on
general grounds.
- "Model,
Theory and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure", The
British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, vol. 59, December 2008, pp. 619–658 (download at BJPS
or here)
- In
this paper, I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis
Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical
literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I
want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the available historical
literature, a strong emphasis will be placed upon analysing the roles
played by theory, model, and evidence and the relationship between
them. In particular, I am going to discuss not only Crick and Watson’s
well-known model and Franklin’s x-ray diffraction pictures (the
evidence) but also the less well known theory of helical diffraction,
which was absolutely crucial to Crick and Watson’s discovery. The
insights into
this
groundbreaking historical episode will have consequences for the ‘new’
received view of scientific models and their function and relationship
to theory and world. The received view, dominated by works by
Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison ([1999]), rather than trying to put
forth a ‘theory of models’, is interested in questions to do with (i)
the function of models in scientific practice and (ii) the construction
of models. In regard to (i), the received view locates the model (as an
idealized, simplified version of the real system under investigation)
between theory and the world and sees the model as allowing the
application of the former to the latter. As to (ii) Cartwright has
argued for a phenomenologically driven view and Morgan and Morrison
([1999]) for the ‘autonomy’ of models in the construction process:
models are determined neither by theory nor by the world. The present
case study of the discovery of the DNA structure strongly challenges
both (i) and (ii). In contrast to claim (i) of the received view, it
was not Crick and Watson’s model but rather the helical diffraction
theory which served a mediating purpose between the model and the x-ray
diffraction pictures. In particular, Cartwright’s take on (ii) is
refuted by a comparison of Franklin’s bottom-up approach with Crick
andWatson’s top-down approach in constructing the model. The former led
to difficulties, which only a strong confidence in the structure
incorporated in the model could circumvent.
- ‘Bogen and
Woodward’s data/phenomena distinction, forms of theory-ladenness, and
the reliability of data’, forthcoming in Synthese
(special issue),
download at Synthese
or here.
- Some
twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward argued for a distinction between
(observable) data and (unobservable) phenomena and claimed that the
latter are inferred from the former. They also provocatively claimed
that higher level theories do not explain and/or predict observable
data but rather unobservable phenomena (contra the likes of van
Fraassen). But if that is the case, they argued, theory-ladenness
cannot occur. The purpose of this paper is to challenge Bogen and
Woodward on the latter point. It appears not to be descriptive of
actual scientific practice. This at least is suggested by the discovery
of the zebra pattern of magnetic anomalies, which has been quoted in
support for Bogen and Woodward’s view (cf. Kaiser 1995), and which I
reconsider here. I argue that a case can be made for an even stronger
form of theory-ladenness: data are ignored if they appear to be
irrelevant from a particular theoretical perspective (TLI). In the
other case I discuss (discovery of weak neutral currents) and which has
been heavily employed by Bogen and Woodward for supporting their
account, I claim that theories can even sometimes give reasons for
belief in the reality of certain phenomena if data are insufficient in
this respect (TLE). Neither TLI nor TLE can be accommodated within
Bogen and Woodward’s account.
- Book review of Thinking about Causes: From
Greek Philosophy to Modern
Physics,
Peter K. Machamer, Gereon Wolters (eds.), University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2007; Metascience (download
here
or at Metascience)
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