Samuel Schindler- talks

 
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Imaginary-Constitutives. The Ontology of Scientific Models.

Hitherto, there have been two approaches towards models in the philosophy of science. One could be called “formalistic” and the other one “methodological”. The first coincides with the so-called semantic view, which employs the notion of semantic models, as used in mathematical logic. The other approach, which became popular through Models as Mediators (Morgan and Morrison 1999) is very much based on case studies and inquires into the methodological role models hold in scientific practice. Where the formalistic approach offers a well-defined notion of models but struggles to justify its use for the empirical sciences, the proponents of the methodological approach present us with detailed case studies but fall short of providing a theory of models and reduce to the hardly falsifiable and almost vacant claim that models are “autonomous agents” or “instruments”, which “mediate” between theory and the world. Neither the formalist nor the methodological approach has managed to tackle the ontology of scientific models, which I attempt to provide in this paper. Instead of being caught in the nitty-gritty of case studies I shall concentrate on a few paradigmatic models, which keep re-appearing in discussions about models. Although I shall follow the semanticists in trying to provide a universal account of models, I shall refrain from deploying a preconceived notion and instead I shall develop my account by inquiring closely into the paradigmatic cases. Models, according to my account, are based on imaginary entities, which I call Imaginary-Constitutives. The introduction of ICs together with a defi-nition of idealization and abstraction will allow us to revise traditional accounts such as Achinstein’s, who characterized models as sets of idealizing assumptions, Hesse’s account of analogies.

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Rehabilitating Theory. The Refusal of the bottom-up construction of Scientific Phenomena.

In this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward (1988)’s data/phenomena distinction, which – al-though in a different domain – similar to Cartwright’s construal of the model of superconductivity (1995) argues for a “bottom-up” construction of phenomena from data without the involvement of theory. I criticise Bogen and Woodward’s account by analysing overlooked subtleties of their melting point of lead example, which is usually cited in the literature to illustrate the data/phenomenon distinc-tion. Yet, the main focus of this paper lies on Matthias Kaiser (1995)’s case study of the plate tectonic revolution, the most extensive case study which has been put forth to support the bottom-up construc-tion of phenomena. I point towards historical and conceptual inadequacies in Kaiser’s account and delve deeper into crucial points, which have been left out not only by Kaiser but also by the entire his-torical literature on the plate tectonic revolution. On the basis of this historical evidence, I demonstrate that the epistemological access to a phenomenon is blocked in the absence of particular theoretical con-cepts. Phenomena cannot be constructed bottom-up but are rather, I suggest, the product of a top-down superposition of an imaginary entity onto data.

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“Bottom-up” Corrections and the Phenomenologically-driven View

In this paper I analyse and criticise Nancy Cartwright’s phenomenologically-driven view and her notion of phenomenological laws, which can only be understood in conjunction. I shall show that both notions spring from Cartwright’s genuine observation of “bottom-up” corrections of theoretical derivations in scientific treatments of real systems. Although I do not deny the existence of these “bottom-up” corrections I hold that they are not apt to support (i) either a view that claims that science is driven by the phenomena and not by our theories, nor (ii) an ontologically autonomous notion of phenomenological laws. Furthermore, it shall be pointed out that one of the most central tenets of Cartwright’s position, namely that the truth comes from the bottom-up through ad-hoc and nonprincipled corrections, is actually not tenable.

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Model, Theory and Evidence in the Discovery of the DNA Structure.

In this paper I discuss the discovery of the DNA structure by Francis Crick and James Watson, which has provoked a large historical literature but has yet not found entry into philosophical debates. I want to redress this imbalance. In contrast to the historical literature a strong emphasis will be placed upon the roles of and the relationship between theory, model and evidence. In particular, I am going to discuss not only Crick and Watson’s well-known scale model and Franklin’s x-ray diffraction pictures (the evidence) but also the less well-known theory of helical diffraction, which was absolutely crucial to Crick and Watson’s discovery. The insights into this ground-breaking historical episode will have consequences for the “new” received view of scientific models and their function and relationship to theory and world. The received view, dominated by works by Nancy Cartwright and Morgan and Morrison (1999), rather than trying to put forth a “theory of models”, is interested in questions to do with (i) the function of models in scientific practice and (ii) the construction of models. In regard to (i), the received view locates the model (as an idealized, simplified version of the real system under investigation) between theory and the world and sees the model as allowing the application of the former to the latter. As to (ii) Cartwright has argued for a phenomenologically-driven view and Morgan and Morrison (1999) for the “autonomy” of models in the construction process: models are neither determined by theory nor by the world. The present case study of the discovery of the DNA structure strongly challenges both (i) and (ii). In contrast to claim (i) of the received view, it was not Crick and Watson’s model but rather the helical diffraction theory, which served a mediating purpose between the model and the x-ray diffraction pictures. In particular Cartwright’s take on (ii) is refuted by comparing Franklin’s bottom-up approach with Crick and Watson’s top-down approach in constructing the model. The former led to difficulties, which only a strong confidence in the structure incorporated in the model could circumvent.

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